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Perspicuity, therefore, requires not only that the ideas should be distinctly
formed, but that they should be expressed by words distinctly and exclu-
sively appropriate to them. But no language is so copious as to supply
words and phrases for every complex idea, or so correct as not to include
many equivocally denoting different ideas.'
The best laws should be constructed as to leave as little as possible to the
decision of the judge.
2
I. Introduction
Every day millions of Americans log on to Web sites and click on hyper-
links3 that direct them to related Web pages.4 Consider the following hypothet-
ical: a physician creates a convenient service for her patients, whereby the
patient accesses a Web site and types in a password. After entering the pass-
word, the patient may access a list of all the medications he or she is taking,
including descriptions of potential side effects and negative interactions with
other drugs.' The page also may contain a section permitting the patient to self-
schedule appointments, a discussion group for others suffering from similar
1. THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 269-70 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed.,
Belknap 1966).
2. THE QUOTABLE LAWYER 165 (David Shrager & Elizabeth Frost eds., 1986) (quoting
ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC (322 B.C.)).
3. See httpJ/www.dictionary.com/cgi-bin/dict.pl?term=hyperlink (defining "hyperlink"
as "[a] reference (link) from some point in one hypertext document to (some point in) another
document or another place in the same document") (last visited Feb. 10, 2002).
4. See THOMAsE. MIlLER, CYBERDIALOGUE,MAJORCYBERTRENDS FOR2000: TAKING
THE "E" Our OF E-CoMmmcE 1 (2000) (finding that U.S. Internet users spend approximately
17,500 hours online during lifetime, equal to 4% of entire lives); As Health Systems Step Into
the Web World, They Stum ble on Unexpected Legal Pitfalls, MED. & HEALTHNEWSL. (Faulkner
& Gray, Inc., Washington, D.C.), May 15, 2000, at 2S1 (noting that at least 17,000 Web sites
address health and estimating that 43% of Web surfers retrieve health care information).
5. See Press Release, Cyber Dialogue, Cyber Dialogue Reports that Doctors Are Missing
Internet Health Opportunity (Oct. 12, 1999) (proposing Internet as interactive source for
patients to find answers regarding treatment regimens or drug side-effects without office visit),
at www.cyberdialogue.conm/news /releases/1999/10-12-cch-doctors.html.
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ailments, or a link allowing the patient to e-mail the physician with questions.6
This concept has the potential to enhance patient control of health care deci-
sions and reduce Medicare expenditures. 7 However, under.a strict reading of
the anti-kickback statute, this service could expose the physician to a fine of
$25,000, exclusion from participation in Medicare and Medicaid programs,
and five years in prison! The anti-kickback statute prohibits referrals, which
are the very core of the Internet commerce business model.' Consequently,
courts may impose potentially draconian punishments if, for example, the site
contains advertising or a link to a drug manufacturer." Consumers eventually
bear the weight of this potential liability, either by denial of access to innova-
tions such as the Web site described or by increased costs of medical care due
to foregone cost-reducing transactions. 11
In 2000, health care expenditures in the United States exceeded one trillion
dollars. 2 The General Accounting Office (GAO) estimates that health care
6. See Gunther Eysenbach, Consumer Health Informatics: RecentAdvances, 320 BRrr.
MED. J. 1713, 1715 (2000) (highlighting MedicaLogic's testing of Internet-based health records
that allow users to search for information on health conditions, order prescription refills, and
communicate with their physician's office); Frances H. Miller, Health Care Information Tech-
nology and Informed Consent: Computers and the Doctor-Patient Relationship, 31 IND. L.
REV. 1019, 1022 (1998) (noting that increasing number of physicians are using e-mail to com-
municate test results and answer patient questions (citing Esther B. Fein, For Many Physicians,
E-mail Is the High-Tech House Call, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1997, at 1)). See generally http'/
www.aboutmyhealth.net (permitting personalized interactive health management by consumers)
(last visited Feb. 10, 2002).
7. See Kathleen M. Vybomy, Legal and Political Issues Facing Telemedicine, 5 ANNALS
HEALTH L. 61,763-64 (1996) (discussing potential of telemedicine to reduce costs and increase
quality of care); Paul Starr, Health Care Reform and the New Economy, HEALTH AFF., Nov.-
Dec. 2000, at 23, 27 (suggesting e-health will introduce competition into health care resulting
in consumer benefits).
8. Anti-Kickback Statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (1994); see infra Part IMI (discussing
elements of statute and legislative history).
9. See Bruce Fried, Limits Can Advance E-Health, MODERN HEALTHCARE (Supp. Eye
on Info), May 29, 2000, at 36 (noting that online pharmacies may compensate physicians for
placement of ads on physicians' Web sites in several ways, such as flat fees or total number of
hits on advertising banner); see also infra Part ll.B (describing e-health business models).
10. See As Health Systems Step into the Web World, They Stumble on Unexpected Legal
Pitfalls, MED. & HEALTH NEWSL. (Faulkner & Gray, Inc., Washington, D.C.), May 15, 2000,
at 2S1 (commenting on potential liability for hyperlinks from provider Web pages to pharma-
ceutical company Web pages); infra Part IU.C.2 (same).
11. See RicHARDA. PosNERECONOMICANALYSiS OFLAW259 (5thed. 1998)(discussing
notion that criminal laws should be clear to avoid creating substantial avoidance costs that result
in forgone socially beneficial transactions); infra Part V (developing economic consequences
of anti-kickback statute).
12. See Amy Schofield & Linda D. Weaver, Health Care Fraud, 37 ANC CRIM. L. REV.
617, 618 n.1 (2000) (discussing projections of health care expenditures in excess of 1.4 trillion
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fraud and abuse costs more than $100 billion annually." There is a clear con-
sensus that policymakers must reduce the cost of health care; 4 consequently,
the legal community lately has focused much attention on the anti-kickback
statute. In response to the problem of health care fraud, the Clinton Justice
Department chose to enforce the Medicare anti-fraud statutes aggressively,
labeling a number of potentially cost-efficient transactions "fraudulent.0
6
Moreover, Congress joined the crusade against Medicare and Medicaid fraud
and abuse by significantly increasing statutory and administrative penalties. 7
This Note argues that Congress has failed to recognize that health care
functions in a capitalist market and that regulations based on sound economic
principles are capable of limiting fraud and promoting efficient business rela-
tionships.'s The current regulatory framework is exceptionally confusing and
unstable. 9 Even attorneys well versed in issues of corporate and commercial
dollars in 2000 (citing PROSPEcTIvE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMW'N, REPORT AND RECOM-
MENDATIONS TO THE CoNoREss 12 (June 1996))).
13. See Health Law Symposium, 7 U. MIMAN Bus. L. REV. 401,439 (1999) (noting GAO's
estimate of fraud and abuse costs).
14. See Stuart M. Gerson & Jennifer E. Gladieux, Advice of Counsel: Eroding Confiden-
tiality in Federal Health Care Law, 51 ALA. L. REV. 163, 165-66 (1999) (noting "clear public
mandate" for aggressive enforcement of health care anti-ftaud laws and suggesting that in
absence of Congressional agreement on health policy, politicians have chosen to wage visible
war on fraud to retain institutional credibility).
15. See Laura Keidan Martin, Not So Fast, It's Regulated: Some Warnings for the E-
Health Biz, Bus. L. TODAY, Sept-Oct. 2000, at 10-14 (discussing anti-kickback prosecution
prominently); Stanley A. Twardy & Michael P. Shea, Anti-kickback Anxiety: How a Criminal
Statute Is Shaping the Health-Care Business, Bus. L. TODAY, May-June 2000, at 18-22 (same).
16. See Health Law Symposium, supra note 13, at 439 (describing Attorney General Janet
Reno's elevation of health care fraud to number two priority behind violent crime). The sym-
posium panelists commented that some prohibited practices actually increase the quality of care.
Id. at 447; see also Charles J. Williams, Toward a Comprehensive Health Care Anti-Kickback
Statute, 64 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 291, 307-08 (1995) (discussing Clinton administration's failed
Health Security Act plan to broaden anti-kickback liability through codification of judicial "one
purpose test"). See infra Part MI.C.1 for further explication of the "one purpose" test.
17. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (I-PPA), Pub. L.
No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936' (1996) (allocating substantial funding to health care fraud enforce-
ment and raising level of civil monetary penalties); Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (BBA), Pub.
L. No. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251 (1997) (expanding Office of Inspector General's (010) authority
to exclude providers from participation in all federal health care programs).
18. See Health Law Symposium, supra note 13, at 444 (asserting that "in the real world"
businesspeople in health care industry seek profitable, efficient relationships based on referrals);
Michael J. Myers, "Elder-Comp, L.L.C.,"45 S.D. L. REv. 540, 549 (2000) ("[M]edicine ... [is]
past the mid-point of [its] migration from professionalism to commercialism; a journey not
initiated by the [profession], but rather undertaken in a parn-sympathetic response to market
forces."); infra Part V (analyzing efficiency of statute's deterrent effect).
19. See Joan Burgess Killgore, Comment, Surgery with a Meat Cleaver: The Criminal
Indictment offHealth CareAttorneys in United States v. Anderson, 43 ST. Louis L.J. 1215,1216
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law frequently are surprised to learn that the anti-kickback statute prohibits
many health care transactions, the equivalents of which are legal in most
industries. 21 In addition to the many problems that plague the anti-kickback
statute generally, the current federal fraud prevention structure is woefully
inadequate for the regulation of emerging technology in the health care field.2 1
The burgeoning Intemet health industry requires the swift revision of the anti-
fraud and abuse laws because "heavy-handed regulation will constrain the
evolution of the [technology-driven] health system, limiting its ability to
deliver extraordinary clinical achievements, economic efficiencies, and con-
sumer empowermnt1."
22
Part II of this Note describes the significance of technology for the future
of health care. Part 11 examines the legislative history of the anti-kickback
statute and the subsequent judicial expansion of liability. Part IV confronts
the problem of inadequate guidance from Congress and regulatory agencies
regarding the convergence of health care and the Internet. The economic
analysis of Part V suggests that the application of the anti-kickback statute is
theoretically flawed because it hinders innovation and stymies efficient rela-
tionships between medical providers. Finally, Part VI contains suggestions
for the revision of the current anti-kickback statute, and, in the alternative, for
the promulgation of new rules for the field of e-health. The foremost recom-
mendation calls for a shift from the present intent-based scheme to a clear
objective framework similar to that of the Stark self-referral provisions.
I. Importance of Technology in the Delivery of Health Care
"mhe 'new economy' rooted in information technology (IT) is not a
transitory phenomenon. Fundamental changes in communications and society
(1999) (commenting that health care regulations are confusing even for experienced health care
professionals (citing BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW CAsEs, MATERIALs AND PROB-
LEMS 574 (3d ed. 1997))).
20. See Killgore, supra note 19, 1216-17 n.12 (noting that "'the state and federal laws
[governing many healthcare financial relationships] prohibit many contractual relationships,
investments, marketing, and recruitment practices that are perfectly legal in other businesses'"
(quoting FURROWET AL., supra note 19, at 574)).
21. See As Health Systema Step into the Web World, They Slum ble on Unexpected Legal
Piffalls, MED. & HEALTH NEWSL. (Faulkner & Gray, Inc., Washington, D.C.), May 15, 2000,
at 2S1 ("Because the 010 has not published any guidelines addressing Internet health care
relationships, nobody can predict exactly how it may determine whether a particular relationship
violated the anti-kickback statutes. .. ." (quoting Eric Tower, of law firm Mintz, Levin, Cohen,
Ferris, Glovsky & Popeo)); see also infra Part IV (discussing inadequacy of guidance from
advisory opinions and fraud alerts, as well as minimal value of health care attorney opinion
letters).
22. Bruce Merlin Fried et al., E-Health: Technologic Revolution Meets Regulatory Con-
strant, HEALTH AFF.,Nov.-Dec. 2000, at 124,124.
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are in the making, and entire new industries are taking shape."' In response
to this shifting economy, many investors have embraced the e-health sector. 4
Investment bankers predict that by the year 2003 the health care electronic
commerce market will be valued at $205 billion, a figure slightly less than
current annual Medicare expenses.' If regulatory agencies respond appropri-
ately to this changing environment, Internet technologies can help repair some
of the problems plaguing the health care system in the United States.26 Before
.proceeding firther, explication of technical definitions and discussion of e-
health business models may be helpful to the reader.
A. Medical Community's Need for Subsidized Technology
Telemedicine involves the transmission of medical data from one loca-
tion to a distant site." Telemedicine's current applications are numerous and
include providing medical care to underserved populations" and fostering
23. Starr, supra note 7, at 23, 23. Starr's work concludes that the emerging digital econ-
omy will have significant impact on health care. Id. at 31-32.
24. See James C. Robinson, Financing the Health Care Internet, HEALTHAFF., Nov.-Dec.
2000, at 72, 72 (noting unprecedented flood of capital into Internet health sector in 1999 and
2000).
25. Stephen T. Parente, Beyond the Hype: A Taxonomy of E-Health Business Models,
HEALTHAFF.,Nov.-Dec. 2000, at 89,89 (citing C. TAYLOR, THE E*VOLUrIoNoFHEALTHCARE,
E*OFFERmnG WORKING PAPER (E'TRADE GROUP, 1999)).
26. See Fried et al., supra note 22, at 124 (concluding that excessive regulation will limit
extraordinary potential of e-health to increase efficiency and quality of patient care); J.D.
Kleinke, Vaporware.com: The Failed Promise of the Health Care Internet, HEALTHAFF., Nov.-
Dec. 2000, at 57, 69 (suggesting that Internet technologies may serve as partial solution to
health care problems, but calling for tempered optimism).
27. See Barry B. Cepelewicz et al., Recent Developments in Medicine and Law, 33 TORT
& INS. L.J. 583, 591-92 (1998) (defining "telemedicine" and discussing potential applications);
see also Ranney V. Wieaemann, On-Line or on-Call? Legal and Ethical Challenges Emerging
in Cybermedicine, 43 ST. Louis U. L. J. 1119, 1119-20 (1999) (defining cybermedicine as
"Internet driven practice of medicine" frequently entailing diagnoses through e-mail). Cyber-
medicine and health e-commerce are similar to telemedicine in that they transmit medical data
over a distance by computers. Id. at 1122. However, while telemedicine is the communication
between two known providers, cybermedicine frequently consists of a provider communicating
with an unknown patient. Id. at 1119-20. In some cases, the distinction between telemedicine,
cybermedicine, and e-health commerce is valuable; however, this Note employs the terms inter-
changeably because the anti-kickback statute's language affects these subsets of medical
communication equally. See infra Part M11 (discussing how anti-kickback statute expansively
prohibits any exchange of remuneration for referrals).
28. See Jeff Tieman, Dialing Up High Tech Medicine: LA University Opens Doors to Its
Third Telemedicine Center to Serve Urban Patients, MODEl HEALTHCARE, JAN. 1,2001, at 36
(noting that pediatric clinic opened in downtown Los Angeles, in addition to two ophthalmology
telemedicine clinics, already serving housing projects). Traditionally, telemedicine projects have
focused on providing services to rural communities, but physicians are utilizing the technology
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global medical conferences and exchanges of technical expertise. 9 Further
beneficial uses of technology include patient record devices that reduce
the administrative overhead resulting from paper filing and handheld wireless
technology that could prevent errors at phannacies. 30 Moreover, a wealth
of possibilities exists for the future of medicine as it merges with informa-
tion technology.3' For example, "internal biological sensors [may soon]
continuously monitor body function, reporting highly accurate data to dis-
ease management technologies."32  These technologies have the potential
to reduce health care costs, but they require an initial outlay for the hard-
ware.33 Although the preceding technologies are promising, the anti-kickback
statute stands as a barrier to their implementation because many business
arrangements that enable advances in health care technology violate the
statute by contemplating the exchange of discounted technology for patient
referrals.4
with increasing regularity to reach underserved inner city populations. Id. One should note that
these outreach projects require significant capital. Id. In the Los Angeles project, donors
contributed over $3 million dollars to start the project, which served 2,000 patients in the year
2000. Id. While a $2 million dollar grant from the county funded a significant portion of the Los
Angeles project, id., many areas that could benefit from such high-tech programs do not have the
tax base or the political support to fund these initiatives. See Teresa 0. Norris, Telemedicine and
Teleradiology, RADIOLOGIC TEcH, Nov. 1, 1999, at 139 (rural telemedicine networks frequently
require financial support from network providers). In such cases, the statute should permit profit
motivated private sector actors to intervene and help provide a technological infrastructure
without having such "free technology provision" characterized as impermissible and felonious
remuneration. Id.
29. See Tieman, supra note 28, at 36 (commenting on potential of telemedicine to im-
prove future of health care for underserved populations); Edward H. Shortliffe, Health Care and
the Next Generation Internet, ANNALs INTERNAL MED., July 15, 1998, at 138, 138-39 (suggest-
ing that with proper investment in technology by academia, industry, and government health
care providers can streamline patient record keeping). Shortliffe suggests the following:
[In the future] citizens will no longer have several medical records scattered in the
offices of various physicians and in the medical record rooms of numerous hospi-
tals. Instead, their records will be linked electronically over the Internet so that
each person has a single "virtual health record," the distributed but unified summary
of all the health care, they have received in their lives.
Id.
30. See Fried, supra note 9, at 36 (commenting on computer chips allowing physicians
to use wireless handheld patient record retrieval devices).
31. See id. (predicting that biological sensors implanted in humans will monitor health).
32. See Shortliffe, supra note 29, at 139 (describing patients' remarkable enthusiasm when
familiar physicians provide Intemet-based interactions for disease management).
33. See Norris, supra note 28, at 139 (discussing significant cost of telemedicine net-
works); Tieman, supra note 28, at 36 (same); supra note 7 (noting benefits of telemedicine).
34. See generally Fried et al., supra note 22 (discussing restraints imposed upon growth
of e-health by anti-kickback and other regulatory schemes).
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Telemedicine may entail the use of normal analog phone lines to link two
computer modems or it may transmit data over the Internet." Advanced
telemedicine applications frequently require high bandwidth lines that can
support the exchange of data-intense radiology images from labs or patient test
results from home monitors to physician offices. 6 The prohibitive costs of
these high bandwidth connections and sophisticated computers impede the
development of Internet-based health care exchanges.3" In many cases, unless
an interested party provides the lines and hardware free of charge or with a
subsidy, health care providers will not participate in technology exchanges
because they will not be able to justify the cost." A typical technology com-
pany's proposal to provide physicians with equipment, such as high-speed
computers, Digital Subscriber Lines (DSL), and special monitors, may violate
the anti-kickback statute.39 For example, physicians could supervise a patient's
treatment through monitoring chips connected to a central processing
database.' Applying a reasonable business model, the chip manufacturer
would provide the technology to the physicians free of charge.41 The physi-
cians then would refer their patients to the chip manufacturer, which would
35. See Kristen R. Jakobsen, Note, Space-Age Medicine, Stone-Age Government: How
Medicare Reimbursement of Telemedicine Services Is Depriving the Elder* of Quality Medical
Treatment, 8 ELDER L. J. 151,157 (2000) (describing methods of telemedical data transmission
(citing Daniel McCarthy, Note & Comment, The Virtual Health Economy: Telemedicine and
the Supply of Primary Care Physicians in RuralAmerica, 21 AM. J.L. & MED. 111,113 (1995);
William .Crump et al., Is Telemedicine Readyfor Prime Time?, PATIENT CARE, Feb. 15, 1997,
at 64)).
36. See Jim Grigsby & Jay H. Sanders, Telemedicine: Where ItIs and Where It's Going,
ANNALS INTERNAL MED., July 15, 1998, at 123, 124 (defining bandwidth as "amount of in-
formation sent per unit of time"); Tieman, supra note 28, at 36 (noting that telemedicine
employs high-speed data connections and videoconferencing technology to reach isolated
individuals).
37. See Fried, supra note 9, at 36 ("The expense of designing, developing and deploying
Web-based health care systems will be immense. [However, t]he commerce that results from
this deployment will generate huge flows of revenue.").
38. See Norris, supra note 28, at 139 (discussing cost prohibitive nature of telernedicine
equipment and need for sponsorship by network providers).
39. See Anti-Kickback Statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (1994) (prohibiting offer,
solicitation, receipt, and inducement of "remuneration" in return for referral of patients). In
this case, the provision of the technology serves as remuneration and the use of the technology
to diagnose patients constitutes referrals. See LR. REP. No. 95-393, at 53 (1977), reprinted
in 1977 U.S.C.CA.N. 3039, 3056 (asserting congressional intent to define "remuneration"
broadly).
40. See Martin, supra note 15, at 12 (describing portable diagnostic device that transmits
patient test results via Interet to physician).
41. See Norris, supra note 28, at 139 ("When providers design telemedicine programs,
it is often the burden of the larger provider (or network) to absorb the highest costs, particularly
when dealing with rural providers on the transmitting end.").
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recoup the cost of the system and make a profit. '42 This business relationship
likely would violate the anti-kickback statute because, under the act's broad
"remuneration" language, the physicians refer patients to the chip company in
return for remuneration in the form of the interpretation technology located in
the physician's offices.43 This analysis of the anti-kickback statute is applica-
ble to any proposed subsidization by the private sector of care-enhancing
medical technology.44 To focus the discussion of the statute's far-reaching
provisions, it is helpful to turn to a consideration of the effect on business
arrangements based on Web sites."s
B. E-Health Business Models
E-health business models generally take the following four forms:
portals, business-to-business applications, business-to-consumer applications,
and connectivity sites, each with its own revenue model and potential to
benefit consumers.' E-health sites have business plans based upon consumer
demand.47 By 1999, twenty-five million Americans were online, and by May
of 2000, thirty-seven million people in the United States had Internet access.4"
One survey found that about half of Interet users were interested in benefit-
ing from a Web site operated by their doctor's office, but only four to six
percent were actually doing so." Interestingly, one-third of online health
42. See id. (noting that physicians "refer" their patients through technology-providing
company's network, which receives fee per patient).
43. See id. ("[T]he fact that these providers are connected via some sort of technological
network or system could mean that the incentive to refer to one another is high."). This quo-
tation understates the implicit understanding in the relationship. The network providing the
technology to the individual physician does not do so through purely beneficent motives; there
is clearly an intent to induce referrals, which violates the statute. Cf Martin, supra note 15, at
12 (commenting upon probable violation in analogous situation that encourages referrals by
paying finder's fee).
44. See generally Part IV (discussing HHS's negative stance toward provision of free or
discounted technology to physicians).
45. See infra Parts ll.B & C (discussing e-health business models and hypothetical
patient-oriented physician site).
46. See Parente, supra note 25, at 90 (introducing four types of e-commerce health sites).
These business models may have a substantial overlap, but are characterized in this manner for
simplicity of explanation. Id.
47. See Jerome P. Kassirer, Patients, Physicians, and the Internet, HEALTH AFF., Nov.-
Dec. 2000, at 115, 118 (discussing Web-based heathcare industry business model (citing Cyber
Dialogue, supra note 5; Press Release, Cyber Dialogue, Online Health Information Seekers
Growing Twice as Fast as Online Population (May 23, 2000), at www.cyberdialogue.com/news
/releases/2000/05-23-cch-future.html)).
48. Kassirer, supra note 47, at 118.
49. Id. (citing SCOTT REENTS, IMPACTS OF THE INTERNET ON THE DOCTOR-PATIENT
RELATIONSHIP: THERISEOFTHEINTERNETHEALTHCONSUMR (1999), atwww.cyberdialogue.
com/pdfs/wp/wp-cch-l 999-doctors.pdf (last visited Feb. 10, 2002)).
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seekers interviewed said they probably would switch physicians if they could
communicate with them by e-mail." The Internet has great potential to
increase the quality of patient care due to the declining significance of prox-
imity and geography."' Additionally, the concept of "click loyalty" will force
health providers to adapt to and respond to patient demand because the




Portals provide a gateway to the vast wealth of information found on the
Internet and are the sites that consumers most commonly access.3 A portal
aggregates in one location many of the services that consumers seek on the
Web, such as e-mail, stock tickers, and search engines.' Examples of popular
portals include Yahoo!, AltaVista, AOL.com, and various newspaper Web
sites.5 Portals advertise heavily to create a name that consumers will remem-
ber and turn to as their first source of information when logging on.' Adver-
tising is the primary source of revenue for portals." To generate revenue, a
Web site must attract a large number of people because advertisers reimburse
the Web page owners either per person visiting the site or by the number of
users following a hyperlinked banner to the advertiser's site.ss With huge
50. Kassirer, supra note 47, at 119 (citing Cyber Dialogue Reports, supra note 5).
51. / See Nicholas P. Terry, Structural andLegal Implications ofE-Health, 33 J. HEALTH
L. 605, 607 (concluding that declining influence of proximity and geography will accelerate
decline of traditional hierarchal health care delivery, giving patients more choice).
52. See id. at 607 n.10 (quoting Ray Lane, President, Oracle, Keynote Address at the
Internet & Electronic Commerce Conference & Exposition (Apr. 28, 1999), at http://www.
pcworld.com/cgi-bin/pcwtoday?ID=10740) (commenting that Internet customers have "click
loyalty" and will revisit site as long as they like prices and content); see also Starr, supra note
7, at 27 (asserting that Internet creates ability for consumers to compare levels of care, which
will require health plans and providers to be sensitive to cost and quality issues).
53. See Parente, supra note 25, at 90 (describing concept of portal site).
54. See Rob Fixmer, From Search Engines to Portal Sites, N.Y. TIMEs, July 27, 1998,
at D4 (describing concept of aggregating free services to entice consumers to make specific
portal their home page); http://www.drkoop.com (last visited Feb. 10, 2002) (providing health
care portal with health encyclopedia, program alerting patient to dangerous drug reactions, and
search engine).
55. See Parente, supra note 25, at 90 (listing popular portal sites).
56. See id. at 90-91 (describing prominence of advertising as portal revenue source); see
also MILLER, supra note 4, at 5 (discussing aggressive advertising known as "cyber branding").
The drive to secure name recognition is the reasoning behind the incredible number of high-
priced "Dot coin" Super Bowl commercials seen in 2000. Id.
57. Parente, supra note 25, at 91.
58. See Maureen A. O'Rourke, Fencing Cyberspace: Drawing Borders in a Virtual
World, 82 MDJN. L. REV. 609,626 (1998) ("[T]he effectiveness of [an] ad is usually measured
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coffers dedicated to generating publicity, pharmaceutical companies invest
significantly in e-health advertising."
2. Business-to-Business and Business-to-Consumer E-Commerce
The business-to-business (b-to-b) model entails the sale of goods by firms
to each other and to government agencies." Web-savvy physicians may use
the b-to-b model to increase their practice volume by directly contracting their
services through online auctions.61 An example of a health care b-to-b site is
Neoforma.com, which provides an online marketplace for the sale of goods
among medical suppliers, equipment vendors, and health care providers.62
Business-to-consumer (b-to-c) sites focus on direct marketing and decreasing
overhead.63 B-to-c models are able to undercut traditional retailers because
technology reduces transaction costs by eliminating many players such as
wholesalers, financiers, and warehousers." Examples of the b-to-c model in-
elude Drugstore.com, an online pharmacy, and Bluecross.com, a site that gives
consumers the capability to design their own health plans on the Internet.6 s
In addition to the benefits of individual business sites, the Internet also pres-
ents the potential for choreographing the relationships of numerous parties in
the delivery of healthcare through connectivity sites.
3. Connectivity Sites
One of the primary innovations of the Internet is its potential to facilitate
seamless links between information systems.' Health care Internet companies
by how many viewer's [sic) 'click-through' (or ink) from the Web site displaying the ad to the
web [sic] site of the advertiser itself.").
59. See REENTS, supra note 49, at 5 (indicating that Web marketing by pharmaceutical
companies has significant effect on increased consumer requests for brand name drugs from
physicians).
60. Parente, supra note 25, at 94.
61. Id.
62. Id.; see http://www.neoforma.com (last visited Mar. 5, 2002) (providing online mar-
ketplace for health care community).
63. See Parente, supra note 25, at 95 (noting that b-to-c e-commerce involves sale of
goods directly to consumers).
64. See LARRY DowNEs & CHUNKA MU, UNLEASHIo TBE KHLER APP: DIrrAL
STRATEGIES FOR MARKET DOMINANCE, 45-46 (1998) (asserting that technology reduces role
of "middleman" in business).
65. See http://www.drugstore.com (last visited Mar. 4, 2002) (providing online ordering
and renewal of prescriptions, vitamins and non-prescription drugs, and information about drug
interactions); httpJ/www.blueross.com (last visited Mar. 4, 2002) (allowing consumers to
design health care plan coverage).
66. Parente, supra note 25, at 92.
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commonly promote Internet connectivity as the solution to fragmentation
among physicians, physician groups, hospitals, and ancillary services.67 The
object of connectivity sites is to streamline transactions by linking health
plans, physicians, hospitals, clinical laboratories, pharmacies, consumers, and
other participants involved in health care financing, marketing, and delivery."
Connectivity sites produce revenue by charging transaction fees for the
service."s Web-based connectivity sites such as Healtheon/WebMD are
appealing because the provider needs no complex proprietary software or
hardware package - one only requires a connection to the Internet.7" A similar
connectivity site, Abaton.com, allows providers to access clinical data such
as laboratory and imaging results, to prescribe drugs, and to refer patients, all
in real time.7 Although the potential variations of e-health business relation-
ships are innumerable, it is possible to highlight many benefits of e-health
through the description of a consumer-oriented Web site, such as the hypo-
thetical physician's site from the Introduction.72
C. Practical Example: Physician Web Site
1. Potential Benefits to Consumers
The most significant potential for an individual physician's site is the
ability to customize the offerings to the individual patient.73 Physicians could
use the model of commercial portals as the basis for their sites and include a
wide array of services and tools to allow a patient to manage his health
online.74 A significant problem with retrieving health information from the
Internet is assuring the quality of what one accesses.7" Physicians could
67. See Klinke, supra note 26, at 62 (describing Internet connectivity purveyors' claims
that technology can solve communication failures in health care delivery).
68. Parente, supra note 25, at 92.
69. See id. (discussing connectivity sites' revenue model).
70. See id. at 93 (noting versatility of Heslthon/WebMD's Web interface); http://www.
webmd.com (last visited Mar. 5, 2002) (providing consumer with personalized format, search
engine, health news, and marketing potential for swifter reimbursement through electronic
claims submission).
71. See id. (describing capabilities of Abaton.com); http://www.abaton.com (last visited
Mar. 5, 2002) (allowing physicians to manage patient diagnostic results online).
72. See supra notes 5-11 and accompanying text (discussing hypothetical physician's
patient-directed Web site).
73. See generally Parente, supra note 25, at 91 (noting personalized trackers that identify
specialized content to meet patient's needs).
74. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text (discussing concept of aggregating
diverse products in one location for consumer's convenience).
75. See Gunther Eysenbach& Thomas L. Diepgen, Consumer Health Informatics Recent
Advances, 317 Birr. MED. J. 1496, 1496 (1998) (finding quality and completeness of health
information on Internet variable).
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address this concern by creating a page of suggested, reputable links sending
patients to in-depth information about specific ailments or any health informa-
tion.76 A similar use of the portal concept would be to link patients to online
support groups to help patients and family cope with illnesses."
Providers could employ the business-to-consumer model on the site by
handling prescription requests and renewals online.78 This would remove
some of the problems involved with mistakes that are made when deciphering
written prescriptions, would allow patients to manage their prescriptions more
easily, and would reduce the administrative costs involved with. contacting
physicians directly to request prescription renewals.79 The physician could
provide a section of the page that would allow patients to manage their
insurance information and use the connectivity concept to link this informa-
tion with their business office to expedite the chain of payment after patients
have received the physician's services.80 Of course, the site would have a link
permitting patients to contact their physician by e-mail.
2. Financing Issues
The potential value of a personalized Web site to a physician's patients
may be great; however, financial constraints generally make it impractical for
individual physicians or small physician groups to undertake these projects
alone."2 Consequently, health care providers must secure an alternate source
76. See REENTS, supra note 49, at 6 (suggesting physicians could have tremendous impact
on patient education by recommending sites with credible information).
77. See Kleinke, supra note 26, at 65 (discussing educational, clinical, and psychological
value derived from patients with similar ailments communicating with each other). The Web
and the existence of real time chat and news groups make communication possible between
similarly situated patients, connecting both individuals suffering rare ailments and those with
more common maladies living thousands of miles apart. Id.
78. See Cybermedicine: The Benefits and RikA ofPurchasingDrugs Over the Internet,
5 J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 1, 1-2 (2000) (discussing benefits and drawbacks of marketing and selling
prescriptions online). The article notes the potential benefits that could accrue to elderly people
who may have mobility concerns and those living in rural locations. Id.
79. Id. at 20-21; see supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing potential for inter-
active prescription management on Web).
80. See supra notes 66-72 and accompanying text (describing connectivity concept and
application to medicine).
81. See Helen Burstin, Traversing the DigitalDivide, HEALTH AFF., Nov.-Dec. 2000, at
245, 246-47 (physician describing her effective use of e-mail with patients). Dr. Burstin
described how she used e-mail to make sure her patients were complying with their treatment
regimens and to help foster a caring doctor-patient relationship that has been lost in the complex
paper shuffle of modem health care. Id.
82. See REENrS, supra note 49, at 5 (asserting that time and capital investments required
by physicians to engage patients through a Web site are considerable).
59 WASH. &LEE L. REV 677 (2002)
of financing to create such sites" and, as discussed above, advertising drives
the Internet revenue model."' Sheer lack of capital and patient demand may
force physicians to include commercial advertising on their sites or to allow
sponsorship of parts of a site. 5 A physician might choose to sell ads and links
on the Web site to a health spa or to an online pharmacy. 6 The advertiser
may compensate the physician in several ways, "including flat fees, a percent-
age of online sales or rewards based on Web traffic volume-for example,
'hits' on the pharmacy's linked site. 's7 Although consumers appear to accept
this model of banner advertising in exchange for "free" services in other
business sectors,"' according to the anti-kickback statute, this arrangement
may constitute an impermissible practice of payment in exchange for patient
referrals."9 Furthermore, regulatory agencies may find that a physician has
referred patients to a pharmacy by virtue of an ad's size and placement on the
physician's Web site simply because there are no other advertisers listed on
the site.'c An alternative to a physician creating a potentially suspect relation-
ship with well-financed drug manufacturers is for a hospital to establish and
maintain Web sites for its affiliated physicians." To recoup the costs incurred
in maintaining the site, the hospital might place its logo on the physician's
home page with a link to its own Web site.92 However, as discussed above,
the current regulatory climate probably would prohibit this arrangement.93
83. See Kassirer, supra note 47, at 122 (noting that Web site hosting is expensive and
time-consuming for individual physicians and describing solution of partnering with commer-
cial enterprises for funding).
84. See MnimR, supra note 4 (discussing concept of "cyber branding" as revenue model);
O'Rourke, supra note 58, at 626 (noting that hyperlinked advertising is becoming Web publish-
ers' primary revenue source).
85. See Kasairer, supra note 47, at 122 (discussing potential reimbursement arrangements
between physicians and advertisers); REENTs, supra note 49, at 5 (noting significant time and
capital expenditures required to operate Web site).
86. See Fried, supra note 9, at 37 (commenting on liability under anti-kickback statute
for inclusion of links to pharmacy).
87. Id.
88. See generally http'//www.yahoo.com (last visited Mar. 6,2002) (providing users with
search engine, maps, news, and e-mail but dedicating significant portion of page to direct sales
links); http.//www.altavista.com (last visited Mar. 6,2002) (same).
89. See Fried, supra note 9, at 37 (commenting that advertiser to physician payment plans
may constitute kickback schemes); infra Part IV (discussing regulatory agencies' position
against technology exchanges).
90. Fried, supra note 9, at 37.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Fried, supra note 9, at 37 (discussing prohibition of Web site in exchange for adver-
tising referrals); Kleinke, supra note 26, at 63 ("The easiest and most obvious application of a
690
REVISION OFANTI-KICKBACK STATUTE
The advance of technology alone will not produce the desired integration
and reduction in health care delivery cost." A number of obstacles stand in
the path of an electronic revolution in health care delivery, the most prominent
being antiquated and cynical federal laws and regulations, such as the anti-
kickback statute.' Having described health care on the Web and its potential
for increasing the quality of care to patients, it is appropriate to turn to a brief
consideration of the anti-kickback statute.
III Anti-Kickback Statute
A. Current Provisions
The primary policy underlying the anti-kickback statute is a concern that
health care providers motivated by their own financial interests will over-
utilize medical services by referring patients for unnecessary procedures,
resulting in a drain of Medicare funds.' To combat this perceived risk, the
anti-kickback statute97 criminalizes the "knowing and willful offer, payment,
solicitation, or receipt of any remuneration (directly or indirectly, overtly or
covertly, in cash or in kind) in return for or to induce a referral of services or
goods payable by Medicare or Medicaid . . . .,, Congress has established
severe penalties for violating the anti-kickback provisions, including fines of
up to $25,000, imprisonment of up to five years, and exclusion from participa-
tion in Medicare and Medicaid. 99 Recognizing that some situations are
shared hospital/physician group Web site-marketing and coordinated scheduling-flies directly
in the face of these [anti-kickback] laws because the effort would be designed specifically to
direct patient referrals.").
94. Kleinke, supra note 26, at 62-63.
95. Id.
96. See TIMOTHY STOLTZFus JOST & SHARON L. DAVIES, THE LAW OF MEDICARE AND
MEDICAID FRAUD AND ABUsE 100 (2001-02 ed. 2000) (listing concerns that "patients will suffer,
program funds will be unnecessarily depleted, and taxpayer dollars will be wasted" if kickbacks
are permitted). The anti-kickback statute affects both Medicare and Medicaid, but this note
focuses on Medicare alone for the sake of brevity. Cf id. at 206-07 (discussing state anti-
kickback prohibitions designed to target Medicaid fraud).
97. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(1994). See generally JOST& DAVS,supra note 96 (com-
prehensively treating prosecution of health care fraud); Schofield & Weaver, supra note 12
(same).
98. James F. Blumstein, The Fraud andAbuse Statute in an Evolving Health Care Mar-
ketplace: Life in the Health Care Speakeasy, 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 205,206 (1996).
99. Anti-Kickback Statute, 42 U.S.C. 1320a-7b(b) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). The statute
provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
(b) Illegal remunerations
(1) Whoever knowingly and willfully solicits or receives any remuneration
(including any kickback, bribe, or rebate) directly or indirectly, overtly or co-
vertly, in cash or in kind -
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unlikely to give rise to fraud and abuse, legislators carved out six statutory
exemptions.1'e In addition to promulgating the statutory exceptions, Congress
vested the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) with the power
to create safe harbors to further protect arrangements that the agency deems
unlikely to result in program abuse.1 ' The combination of the anti-kickback
statute's broad reach and the congressional delegation of interpretive powers
has made investigators and attorneys at the Office of Inspector General (OIG),
a subdivision of HHS, and the Department of Justice (DOJ) arbiters of the
legality of health care transactions."e
(A) in return for referring an individual to a person for the furnishing or
arranging for the furnishing of any item or service for which payment may
be made in whole or in part under a Federal health care program, or
(B) in return for purchasing, leasing, ordering, or arranging for or recom-
mending purchasing, leasing, or ordering any good, facility, service, or item
for which payment may be made in whole or in part under a Federal health
care program, shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof, shall
be fined not more than $25,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years,
or both.
(2) Whoever knowingly and willfully offers or pays any remuneration (including
any kickback, bribe, or rebate) directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash
or in kind to any person to induce such person -
(A) to refer an individual to a person for the furnishing or arranging for the
furnishing of any item or service for which payment may be made in whole
or in part under a Federal health care program, or
(B) to purchase, lease, order, or arrange for or recommend purchasing,
leasing, or ordering any good, facility, service, or item for which payment
may be made in whole or in part under a Federal health care program, shall
be guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more
than $25,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both.
Id
100. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(bX3) (1994) (providing exceptions for discounts, payments
within bona fide employment relationship, protection for group purchasing organizations,
waivers of Medicare Part B coinsurance obligations, and certain risk-sharing arrangements of
managed care organizations). The ramifications of these provisions are complex and beyond
the scope of this Note because they generally do not affect the e-health transactions under
consideration. But see infra Part IV (discussing 01G position that typical telemedicine arrange-
ments are not covered under discounts exemption).
101. See Medicare and Medicaid Patient and Program Protection Act of 1987 (MMPPPA),
Pub L. No. 100-93, § 2, 101 Stat. 680, 682 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(bX7) (1994))
(providing that Secretary of HHS shall promulgate safe harbor regulations describing practices
not subject to prosecution).
102. See S. REP. No. 94-1324, at 3 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.CA.N. 5420, 5422
(describing one of OIG's responsibilities as investigation of health care fraud "to increase
[Medicare and Medicaid's] economy and efficiency and to reduce the likelihood of fraud and





The anti-kickback statute originally prohibited only "bribes and kick-
backs"1  until Congress amended the statute in 1977 to extend its reach by
substituting "any remuneration" for the "bribes and kickbacks" language.' °
The amendment simultaneously elevated violations from misdemeanor to
felony status.'05 It is clear from the legislative history that Congress intended
for regulators and courts to interpret the phrase "remuneration" broadly."°
However, the expansive language has raised opposition from many practitio-
ners and scholars who argue that the broad construction of the provisions not
only punishes unscrupulous providers, but also inhibits innocuous and socially
beneficial arrangements." ° The dynamics of e-health exacerbate the problem
of overbroad language because Internet business models rely heavily on the
use of referrals." °
In response to concerns about the breadth of the statute, Congress created
a requirement of specific intent to preclude the conviction of an individual
acting improperly but inadvertently."° The Omnibus Reconciliation Act of
1980 added the requirement that a violation must result from "knowing" and
"willful" action.110 Although the core of the statute amounts to no more than
a page in the United States Code, the anti-kickback statute is both perplexing
103. Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 242(b), 86 Stat. 1329,
1419 (1972) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (1994)).
104. See JOST & DAVIES, supra note 96, at 112 n.4 (discussing substitution of"remunera-
tion" for "bribes and kickbacks" (citing Medicare and Medicaid Anti-Fraud and Abuse Amend-
ments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-142, 91 Stat. 1175 (1977) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1320a-7b(bXlXA) and (B) (1994)))).
105. Id. at 113.
106. See H.R. REP. No. 95-393, supra note 39, at 53 (asserting congressional intent to
define "remuneration" broadly).
107. See, e.g., Medicare and State Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; 010 Anti-
Kickback Provisions, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,952, 35,952 (July 29, 1991) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pt.
1001); JOST & DAVIES, supra note 96, at 114 n.14 (noting criticism of statute's broad scope
(citing David M. Frankford, Creating and Dividing the Fruits of Collective Economic Activity:
ReferralsAmong Health Care Providers, 89 CoI.m L. REV. 1861,1875-76 (1989))); Killgore,
supra note 19, at 1222 (noting concern that broad application would ensnare socially beneficial
transactions (citing TIMOTHiY STOLTZFUS JOST & SHARON L. DAVIES, THE LAW OF MEDICARE
AND MEDICAID FRAUD AND ABUSE 95 (1998 ed. 1997)).
108. See supra notes 53-59, 82-93 and accompanying text (discussing reliance on referrals
by e-commerce enterprises).
109. See JOST & DAVIES, supra note 96, at 114-15 n.1 (discussing addition of scienter
requirement (citing Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1980, Pub L. No. 96-499, 94 Stat. 2599
(1980) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(bXl) & (2) (1994)))).
110. See The Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1980, supra note 109 (creating liability for
anyone who "knowingly and willfully offers or pays any remuneration (including any kickback,
bribe, or rebate)").
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and controversial because of the controversy surrounding the scienter ele-
ment. 11 Courts currently are adjudicating two interrelated and controversial
elements of the anti-kickback statute: first, whether an impermissible referral
must be a "substantial purpose" of a transaction," 2 and second, the meaning
of the "knowing and willful" scienter standard.'
C. Judicial Expansion of Liability
1. United States v. Greber and the "One Purpose" Test
The most significant judicial development in health care fraud is the
Third Circuit's promulgation of the "one purpose" test in United States v.
Greber,"4 wherein the court greatly expanded liability under the anti-kickback
statute."' In Greber, the Third Circuit considered whether payments made to
a physician as "interpretation fees" in connection with clinical tests could
serve as a basis for Medicare fraud." 6 The defendant, a cardiologist named
Dr. Alvin Greber, ran his own business that provided physicians with diagnos-
tic services, including heart monitors." 7 Dr. Greber's payment practices
entailed billing Medicare for heart monitors and subsequently forwarding
forty percent of any Medicare reimbursement to the referring physician as an
"interpretation fee.""' At issue on appeal was the trial court's jury instruc-
tion, stating that even though the referring physician might interpret the results
as a consultant, this consulting was immaterial when "a purpose" of the fee
was to induce a referral." 9 In opposition to this reading, Dr. Greber claimed
that the jury could find a violation only if he rendered a fee solely to induce
a referral.2 0 Evaluating Congress's intent, the Third Circuit agreed with the
trial court's instruction and reasoned that "remuneration" covers not only
111. See JosT & DAvBS, supra note 96, at 82 (noting that while statute's goal of stopping
overutilization appears uncontroversial, in practice statute creates enormous controversy);
Killgore, supra note 19, at 1244-45 (asserting that anti-kickback statute has been controversial
sincf its creation, and that even seasoned health care attorneys find the statute and its subse-
quent "clarifications" very confusing).
112. See infra Part MI.C.1 (discussing "one purpose" test).
113. See infra Part UM.C.2 (discussing scienter element).
114. 760 F.2d 68 (3d Cir. 1985).
115. See United States v. Greber, 760 F.2d 68, 69 (3d Cir. 1985) (establishing violation
of anti-kickback statute if one purpose of payment is to induce referrals); see also United States
v. Davis, 132 F.3d 1092, 1094 (5th Cir. 1998) (adopting "one purpose test"); United States v.
Kats, 871 F.2d 105, 108 (9th Cir. 1989) (same).
116. Greber, 760 F.2d at 70.
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sums for which a physician performs no actual service, but also amounts for
which a physician expends some professional effort.' 2' Consequently, the
court held that "[flf one purpose of the payment was to induce future referrals,
the medicare [sic] statute has been violated."' 22
In United States v. McClatchey," the Tenth Circuit reaffirmed the viabil-
ity of Greber's "one purpose" test.124 The McClatchey court recognized the
reality of the defendant's argument that "[e]very business relationship be-
tween a hospital and a physician is based 'at least in part' on the hospital's
expectation that the physician will choose to refer patients.' 25 However, the
court validated the district court's instruction, finding that a "hospital or
individual may lawfully enter into a business relationship with a doctor and
even hope for or expect referrals from that doctor, so long as the hospital is
motivated to enter into the relationship for legal reasons entirely distinct from
its collateral hope for referrals.'026  Failing to elaborate on the distinction
between "hoping" and "intending," the court created a game of semantics for
attorneys to contest'
2 7
Although the "one purpose" test is the prevailing standard, in United
States v. Bay State Ambulance and Hospital Rental Service, Inc.," the First
Circuit questioned the doctrine.'" In Bay State, the court of appeals approved
121. Id.
122. Id. at 69 (emphasis added).
123. 217 F.3d 823 (10th Cir. 2000).
124. See United States v. McClatchey, 217 F.3d 823, 835 (10th Cir. 2000) (following
"sound -reasoning" of Greber and holding that one purpose of offer or payment for referral
sufficient for conviction). In McClatchey, the Tenth Circuit considered the validity of a trial
court's jury instruction resulting in conviction of a hospital executive. Id. at 826. The defendant
.took exception to the trial court's instruction that the jury could convict "if remuneration was paid
'at least in part' to induce patient referrals." Id. McClatchey, the Chief Operating Officer of
Baptist Medical Center, was integral in completing and renewing contracts with physicians who
owned a specialized practice that treated nursing home patients. Id. at 827. The arrangement
gave the two physicians $75,000 each per year and titles as Co-Directors of Gerontology in return
for the referral of patients requiring hospitalization. Id. The court reasoned that the trial courtfs
distinction between a collateral hope for referrals and an intent to induce referrals was sufficient
to protect McClatchey's rights. Id. at 834-35. Consequently, the court upheld McClatchey's
conviction, finding that an individual violates the anti-kickback statute "so long as one purpose
of the offer or payment is to induce Medicare or Medicaid patient referrals." Id. at 835.
125. Id. at 834.
126. Id. The court addressed the problematic issues of proof that the "one purpose" stan-
dard creates and concluded simply that this is the "role which our system of justice assigns to
the finder of fact." Id. at 834 n.7.
127. See id. at 834 n.7 (recognizing problematic issues of proof that "one purpose" stan-
dard creates but leaving resolution to finder of fact).
128. 874 F.2d 20 (1 st Cir. 1989).
129. See United States v. Bay State Ambulance & Hosp. Rental Serv., Inc., 874 F.2d 20,
29-30 (1 st Cir. 1989) (approving jury instruction allowing conviction only if improper motiva-
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a jury instruction that required that the improper purpose motivating a transac-
tion be the "primary purpose" for making payments. 3° Although Bay State
supports the "primary purpose" test, the opinion is disjointed."' After accept-
ing the primary purpose test, the court referred to the reasoning of Greber as
"impressive," leaving the vitality of the "primary purpose" jury instruction in
question.' In addition to disagreeing about the validity of the one purpose
test, courts and scholars continue to debate the meaning of the statute's
"willful" and "knowing" requirement. 33
2. Scienter Standard
Critics of the anti-kickback statute continually have argued that despite
administrative attempts to clarify the bounds of liability,134 regulators cannot
reasonably expect health care providers to know when the industry's complex
transactions will violate the statute's provisions. 135 This concern about the
statute's ambiguity forms the basis for the argument over whether the scienter
element requires specific knowledge of an arrangement's illegality. 36 In
Hanlester Network v. Shalala,137 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals consid-
ered the level of intent required for a conviction under the "knowingly and
tion was primary purpose of transaction). In Bay State, the First Circuit considered the validity
of a jury instruction creating a "primary purpose" test for violation of the anti-kickback statute.
Id. The facts indicated that Bay State Ambulance Company gave a hospital official two cars and
seven checks in order to secure a city ambulance service contract. Id. at 26. In reviewing the
jury instruction, the court of appeals concluded that it was not prejudicial error to provide the
higher "primary purpose" standard for the government to convict the defendants. Id. at 30.
However, the court did not "decide the exact reach of the statute," and stated that it was "im-
pressed" by the reasoning of Greber. Id. at 29-30. The court ultimately held that the "primary
purpose" jury' instruction comported with congressional intent and affirmed the defendant's cbn-
viction. Id. at 30, 36.
130. Id. at 30.
131. See supra note 129 (noting court's juxtaposition of "primary purpose" test and ap-
proval of Greber's reasoning).
132. Id. at 29-30.
133. See infra Part M.C.2 (addressing judicial interpretation of anti-kickback statute's
scienter element).
134. See infra Part IVA-B (discussing Office of Inspector General's attempts to clarify
statute through fraud alerts and advisory opinions).
135. JOST & DAVIES, supra note 96, at 163; see, e.g.,As Health Systems Step into the Web
World, They Stumble on Unexpected Legal Pifalls, supra note 4, at 2S1 (criticizing absence
of guidance by 010 regarding Internet health care transactions); James F. Blumstein, Rational-
izing the Fraud andAbuse Statute, HEALTHAFF., Winter 1996, at 118, 122 (lambasting present
regulatory scheme's ambiguity); David S. Krakoff & Matthew C. Holloran, The Accidental
Kickback, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 15, 1997, at $50 (discussing danger of accidental violation).
136. See JOsT & DAvIES, supra note 96, at 163-64 (explaining that due to statute's ambigu-
ity critics seek increased level of intent to avoid accidental violation).
137. 51 F.3d 1390 (9th Cir. 1995).
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willfully" scienter standard. 3 ' The defendant, Hanlester Network (Hanlester),
was a general partnership of physician joint venture laboratories. 39 Hanlester
and its affiliated labs entered into agreements with Smithkline Bioscience
Laboratories (SKBL), whereby SKBL agreed to provide management services
in return for a percentage of each lab's profits. 40 In accordance with the
agreements, SKBL performed eighty-five to ninety percent of the tests ordered
by physicians at the Hanlester labs. 4' The defendants, general partners of the
Hanlester network, argued that they could not possess the appropriate level of
intent because the interpretation of the statute was "highly debatable."'1 The
Ninth Circuit rejected the defendant's approach but concluded that the "know-
ingly and willfully" language required the defendants to "(1) know that [the
anti-kickback statute] prohibits offering or paying remuneration to induce
referrals, and (2) engage in prohibited conduct with the specific intent to
disobey the law."143 Ultimately, the court found that the individual defendants
did not posses the requisite intent, and it reversed the trial court's grant of
summary judgment for the government.'" This decision marked a significant
victory for the health care industry.4 s Under the Hanlester framework, a
defendant who has a good faith but mistaken belief that a business arrange-
ment is proper, or who is ignorant of the law, is not guilty of an anti-kickback
violation." Having considered the prominent role of the OIG in interpreting
the anti-kickback statute"41 and the importance of telemedicine technology
138. See Hanlester Network v. Shalala, 51 F3d 1390,1399-1401 (9th Cir. 1995) (evaluat-
ing meaning of "knowing and willful" action).
139. See id. at 1394-95 (describing composition and structure of partnership).
140. See id. at 1395 (discussing elements of management services arrangement).
141. Id.
142. See id. at 1399 (arguing that liability cannot flow from statutes with highly debatable
interpretations (citing United States v. Dahlstrom, 713 F.2d 1423, 1427 (9th Cir. 1983))). In
Dahlstrom, the Ninth Circuit found that the defendant could not willingly violate a complex
Internal Revenue Service regulation, the interpretation of which was open to debate. Dahlatrm,
713 F.2d at 1427-28. The Hanlester court rejected the defendants' reliance on Dahlslrom, find-
ing the complicated tax regulations of Dahlrom distinguishable from the complexity presented
by the anti-kickback statute. Hanlester, 51 F.3d at 1399.
143. Id. at 1400.
144. See id. at 1402 (finding no personal liability and reversing HHS's imposition of sanc-
tions). -
145. See JOST&DAViES, supra note 96, at 164 (noting significance of ruling in Hanlester).
But see United States v. Davis, 132 F.3d 1092, 1094 (5th Cir. 1998) (construing Hanlester
closely). In Davis, the Fifth Circuit read Hanlester narrowly to conclude that the prosecution
need not prove the defendant knew of the particular statute that criminalized his action; it need
only prove that the defendant knew the conduct was generally unlawful.
146. See Krakoff & Holloran, supra note 135, at S50, S53 (commenting on absence of
liability for mistaken belief or ignorance under Hanlester).
147. See supra note 101-02 and accompanying text (describing breadth of OIO's discretion
in interpreting anti-kickback statute).
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grants,14 it is appropriate to consider their convergence in the OIG's pro-
nouncements regarding the provision of discounted technology.'49
IV Anti-Kickback Statute's Obsolescence
A. Special FraudAlerts and Correspondence
The anti-kickback statute is an antiquated law that is not suited for
regulation of the digital economy.'" ° Consequently, health care regulators
generally have taken a dim view of transactions proposing the transfer of
subsidized technology to physicians in return for patient referrals.15' The final
rule adopting the anti-kickback safe harbor provisions of 1991 comments on
the practice of providing free computers to physicians.' 2 The preamble to the
regulations draws a distinction between machines that physicians can use only
for a specific purpose and those that physicians may use to perform numerous
tasks, such as personal computers."5 3 The preamble suggests that the latter
"may well constitute an illegal inducement."'' Accordingly, to avoid liability
under the anti-kickback statute, technology providers must develop a method
for limiting the equipment so that physicians may use it in a circumscribed
manner relating to the relationship.'55
148. See supra Part 11 (describing value of telemedicine and need for subsidized technol-
ogy).
149. See infra Part IV (discussing 010's stance towards technology grants).
150. See John Bentivogiio, Unleash the Internet: Outdated Laws and Regulations Are
Holding Back Advances in E-Health Ventures, MODERN HEALTHCARE, Nov. 6, 2000, at 76
(arguing that current anti-kickback statute is outdated and criminalizes many e-health ventures
that pose little risk of abuse), Fried et al., supra note 22, at 129 (discussing need for modemi-
zation of anti-kickback statute to meet challenges of e-health).
151. See infra notes 152-75 and accompanying text (discussing HHS's stance against tele-
medicine relationships involving discounted technology).
152. Medicare and State Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; OIG Anti-Kickback
Provisions, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,952,35,978 (July 29, 1991)(codified at42 C.F.R. pt. 1001 (1999)).
The preamble states:
In some cases the computer can only be used as part of a particular service that is
being provided, for example, printing out the results of laboratory tests. In this
situation, it appears that the computer has no independent value apart from the
service being provided and that the purpose of the free computer is not to induce
an act prohibited by the statute.... In contrast, sometimes the computer that is
given away is a regular personal computer, which the physician is free to use for a
variety of purposes in addition to receiving test results. In that situation the com-
puter has a definite value to the physician, and, depending on' the circumstances,
may well constitute an illegal inducement.
Id.
153. See id. (distinguishing legality of providing free computers by level of versatility).
154. Id.
155. See 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952 (hX1999) (including discounts within safe harbor).
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In its 1994 publication, Special Fraud Alert: Arrangements for the
Provision of Clinical Lab Services, HHS commented that "whenever a labora-
tory offers or gives to a source of referrals anything of value not paid for at
fair market value, the inference may be made that the thing of value is offered
to induce the referral of business."156 Additionally, the alert describes situa-
tions leading to impermissible arrangements between labs and physicians that
implicate the anti-kickback statute.5 7 Prohibited arrangements include the
provision of computers or fax machines, unless the physician uses such
equipment exclusively for the performance of the outside laboratory's work.5 "
The OIG also has addressed the issue of discounted technology through two
letters, dated July 1, 1997159 and July 3, 1997."6 The correspondence com-
ments that parties may be able to craft free technology transfers in a way that
avoids sanction under the anti-kickback statute, but that such arrangements
frequently are "shams" and are "generally disfavored."'' Fraud alerts and
published correspondence may serve to afford health care providers insight
into HHS's priorities and interpretations; however, parties must request a
formal advisory opinion from the OIG to secure overt approval of a contem-
plated transaction. 62
B. Advisory Opinions
1. Substantive Treatment of Telemedicine
Congress recognized the need for clarification of the anti-kickback sta-
tute. Consequently, as part of the Health Insurance Portability and Account-
ability Act of 1996 (HIPPA), it required HHS to issue prospective advisory
opinions to individuals contemplating transactions that might violate the
156. Special Fraud Alert Arrangements for the Provision of Clinical Lab Services, 59 Fed.
Reg. 65,372,65,377 (Dec. 19, 1994).
157. See id. (discussing provision of free computers).
158. Id.
159. See Op. Letter, Off. Inspector Gen., HI-S (July 1, 1997) (stating that provision of free
fax machines could potentially violate statute unless use is restricted), at http://oig.hhs.gov/ak/
provision070197.htn.
160. See Op. Letter, Off. Inspector Gen., HHS (July 3, 1997) (warning that OI will
examine substance of arrangement over form and that it will hold technology provider liable
for any "reasonably foreseeable 'misuse' of loaner computer and dedicated fax line), at httpi/
oig.hhs.gov/ak/freecomputers.htm. The letter also notes that agreements providing that the user
will not employ the technology for an improper purpose are not sufficient to preclude liability.
Id.
161. See id. (commenting that OI will view all free technology arrangements "with skep-
ticism").
162. See JOsT & DAvMs, supra note 96, at 178 (discussing special fraud alerts), id. at 200-
205 (describing advisoty opinion process).
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statute. 63 Two OIG advisory opinions deal specifically with telemedicine.'"
Advisory Opinion 98-18 discusses the exchange of equipment that allows an
optometrist to consult with an ophthalmologist at a distant location. 65 In the
opinion, the OIG allowed the proposed arrangement after considering the
parties' intent to pay fair market value for the equipment rental and the physi-
cian's agreement not to advertise the availability of the technology."6 Under
the circumstances, the OIG concluded that the arrangement limited the poten-
tial for abuse. 67 However, one should read the language carefully. The
opinion does not state that these arrangements are permissible.' Rather, it
concludes that the OIG will not impose liability in the instant case, even
though the arrangement may technically violate the statute. 69 Advisory
Opinion 99-14 concerns technology that permits rural physicians to consult
with specialists in a metropolitan area. 7 ' The opinion comments that there
is a presumption against the distribution of free technology, but states that
in the case at hand the OIG will not impose sanctions.'71 The opinion pro-
vides a number of reasons for the decision, including a clear congressional
intent to favor the program, an enforcement mechanism in place to regulate
the relationship, and the significant potential public benefit from the technol-
163. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPPA), Pub. L. No.
104-191, § 205, 110 Stat. 1936,2000-03 (1996) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7d
(Supp. V 1999)).
164. See Advisory Op., Off. Inspector Gen., HHS No. 98-18 (Nov. 25, 1998) [hereinafter
Advisory Op. 98-18] (discussing arrangement in which ophthalmologist rented equipment to
optometrist to facilitate telemedicine consultation), at http/oig.hhs.gov/advopn/1998/ao98_
18.htm; Advisory Op., Off. Inspector Gen., HS No. 99-14 (Dec. 28, 1999) [hereinafter
Advisory Op. 99-14] (evaluating propriety of proposed telemedicine grant to rural community),
at http://oig.hhs.gov/advopn/1999/ao9914.htm.
165. See Advisory Op. 98-18, supra note 164 (evaluating likelihood that proposed arrange-
ment would result in improper referrals in exchange for remuneration).
166. See id. (finding that agreement not to advertise technology reduced likelihood of
abuse and concluding that payment of fair market value for lease negated fraudulent intent).
This is an example of a case in which the regulatory scheme rejects common sense. If hypothet-
ical optometrist A's arrangement were publicized, presumably patients from competitors,
optometrists B and C, would seek the services of optometrist A, who has the telemedicine
arrangement. Optometrist A's arrangement would force optometrists B and C to seek similar
arrangements, increasing the quality of eye care for all of the community's citizens.
167. See id. (concluding that safeguards lowered potential for abuse to acceptable level).
168. See id. (stating that "arrangement may constitute prohibited remuneration").
169. See id. (concluding that "although the telemedicine consultation arrangement may
constitute prohibited remuneration under the anti-kickback statute if the requisite intent is
present, the OIG will not subject it to sanctions arising under the anti-kickback statute").
170. See Advisory Op. 99-14, supra note 164 (considering whether hospital's provision
of technology grants to rural hospitals constitutes anti-kickback violation).
171. See id. (concluding "the Arrangement . . . could potentially involve prohibited
remuneration.., however, the Office of Inspector General ('010') will not impose sanctions").
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ogy. 72 Advisory Opinion 99-14 is particularly concerned with the benefit to
the community at large.173 Policymakers should codify this position so that
individuals may rely on it when structuring their transactions. 174 One positive
feature of the advisory opinion process is the OIG's willingness to consider
the relevance of whether the contemplated transaction will increase costs to
federal health care programs.
17
2. Structural Shortcomings
As noted in Part m, the scienter standard and purpose required to violate
the anti-kickback statute are murky. 7  Nevertheless, representatives of the
OIG have argued that in light of the advisory opinion process, "[i]ndividual
providers need not guess anymore whether their business arrangements will
be subject to applicable sanctions [and that]... the industry as a whole bene-
fits from the reasoning contained in the opinions."' 77 Notwithstanding the
OIG's confidence in the efficacy of the advisory opinion process, the experi-
ences of many transactional attorneys in the health care field do not support
these broad claims. 78 It is an infrequent occurrence when an OIG advisory
172. See id. (listing congressional intent to foster arrangements, enforcement mechanisms,
limited remuneration, and significant potential community benefit as factors mitigating against
imposing liability).
173. See id. (favoring potential health benefits to rural community accruing from proposed
arrangement).
174. See infra Part VIA (proposing requirement that government prove increase in cost
to federal health care program for conviction under anti-kickback statute).
175. See Twardy &Shea, supra note 15, at 21 ("IT]he agency has said in many cases that
although the statute applies, it should not be enforced because the proposed arrangement would
not increase costs to federal health-cae programs.").
176. See supra notes 114-49 and accompanying text (discussing debate over appropriate
level of intent); see also JOST & DAVIES, supra note 96, at 101 (describing mens rea element as
murky).
177. Lewis Morris & Gary W. Thompson, Reflections on the Government's Stick and
CarrotApproach to FightingHealth Care Fraud, 51 ALA. L. REV. 319,351 (1999). The authors
of the preceding article, Lewis Moris and Gary W. Thompson, play important roles for the 010.
Id. at 319. Morris serves as the Assistant Inspector General for Legal Affairs within the 010.
Id. Iis responsibilities include coordinating the 010's role in investigation and resolution of
health care fraud cases. Id. Thompson is the Associate Counsel in the Civil Recoveries Branch,
Office of Counsel to the Inspector General, HHS. Id. Thompson's duties include representing
the OIG in resolution of civil health care fraud matters. Id Given the authors' stake in the
discussion, one should examine critically their blanket statement concerning the value of the
advisory opinion process.
178. See As Health Systems Step into the Web World, They Stumble on Unexpected Legal
Pifalls, supra- note 4, at 2S1 (criticizing lack of guidance from 010 concerning Internet trans-
actions), Blumstein, supra note 135, at 127-28 (asserting that HHS guidance is of limited value
because it does not constitute legal precedent); Retta M. Riordan, Will New Guidance Mecha-
nisms Provide Needed Clarifications to Industry Under Medicare/Medicaid Anti-Kickback
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opinion actually states that a given arrangement does not violate the statute. 1 9
The typical language states that an arrangement "potentially implicates" the
statute, but under the facts of the case at hand, sanctions will not follow.' In
fact, the OIG issues on average sixteen opinions per year, making the likelihood
of securing a response to a specific question low.' These opinions bind only
the parties that request them.'" Consequently, an individual who is not a party
to an opinion should rely on a previous opinion only as possible guidance." 3
In addition to the failure to resolve the statute's ambiguity, concerns
regarding the severity of punishment and significant costs further limit the
value of the advisory opinion process.8 4 Considering the requirement that
the requesting party disclose "all relevant facts" to the OIG and the existence
of severe criminal penalties, many health care entities are likely to decline to
present candid information to the agency, fearing that the OIG will use the
information against them in a later proceeding.' Even if the Fifth Amend-
ment would bar this evidence from a criminal prosecution, no shield exists to
protect individuals and entities from the potentially devastating administrative
remedies available to the OIG. 8 6 In light of the aggressive regulatory environ-
Statute?, I Health Care Fraud Rep. (BNA) 133, 133 (Feb. 26, 1997) (questioning ability of
advisory opinions to clarify statute).
179. See supra note 169 and accompanying text (providing example of 010's noncommit-
tal language).
180. Id.
181. See http'//oig.hhs.gov/fraud/advisoryopinions/opinions.html (last visited Mar. 25,
2002) (listing advisory opinions). The 010 issued nineteen advisory opinions in 1998, fourteen
in 1999, eleven in 2000, and twenty-one in 2001 resulting in an average of 16.25 advisory
opinions for all years in which the statute was in effect for the entire year. Id.
182. See JOST & DAVIES, supra note 96, at 205 (explaining that advisory opinions are
instructive but not binding upon nonparties).
183. Id.
184. See infra note 193 and accompanying text (discussing potential use of request by
prosecution and prohibitive cost).
185. See Morris & Thompson, supra note 177, at 351 ("To receive substantive guidance,
parties are required to submit detailed descriptions of their arrangements, including operating
and financial documents." (citing 42 C.F.R. § 1008.31 (1998), as amended in 63 Fed. Reg.
38,311,38,312 (1998))); see also Killgore, supra note 19, at 1229 (noting that many health care
providers are reluctant to give OIG candid disclosure due to agency's ability to use reported
information in later civil, criminal, or administrative action (citing Robert S. Ryland, HHS OIG
Advisory Opinion Process: Better Than Voluntary Disclosure, 4 BUS. CRIM. BULL.: COML.
& LrTrG. 1, 3-4 (1997))). One should note that DOJ actually prosecutes criminal cases, whereas
the OIG pursues administrative and civil remedies. See JOST & DAVIES, supra note 96, at 3-4
(describing division of enforcement responsibilities). For convenience, this Note refers to the
010 as "prosecuting" because it typically conducts investigations and makes initial determina-
tions of legality before transmitting findings to the DOJ. Id.
186. See JOST & DAVIES, supra note 96, at 103-04 (describing administrative exclusion
power); see also U.S. CONST. amend. V (extending privilege from self-incrimination only to
criminal prosecution).
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ment, clients are now more likely to request opinion letters from legal
counsel." The theory motivating clients to seek opinion letters is that at trial,
an individual under indictment could use the letters in an "advice of counsel"
defense to counter the government's proof of intent.""8 Ironically, health care
attorneys are now less likely to render the unequivocal advice clients seek
because of the heightened enforcement of the anti-kickback statute."8 9 Conse-
quently, attorneys bill clients to compose thirty-page vacillating opinion
letters advising, "This transaction should be fine, but it might come under the
ambit of the statute, although I don't think it does - but it might."'" More-
over, should clients seek to use an opinion letter to defend themselves at trial,
the prosecution likely would turn the document around and use the advice
about the potential for violation as evidence of"knowledge.'191 An additional
problem with the advisory opinion process is the cost a client incurs to collect
all of the relevant documents and to compose a request."7 Consequently,
small health care providers such as individual physicians may be unable to pay
the costs and attorneys fees for such a request.'93 Thus, the OIG opinions are
of questionable value to the e-health community. The complexity of the
statute, its overbroad language, and its low general intent standard deter a
number of socially beneficial transactions that are foregone due to confusion
about the bounds of legal action.'94 Thus, the anti-kickback statute creates
187. See JOST & DAVIES, supra note 96, at 178 (stating that increased governmental scru-
tiny of transactions makes clients likely to seek more definite advice).
188. See id. at 174-78 (discussing advice of counsel defense).
189. See United States v. Anderson, 85 F. Supp. 2d 1047, 1052 (D. Kan. 1999), rev'd sub
nom. on other grounds, United States v. McClatchey, 217 F.3d 823 (10th Cir. 2000) (prosecut-
ing health care attorneys for structuring transactions violating anti-kickback violation); JOST &
DAVIES, supra note 96, at 178 n.21 (advising, in aftermath of Anderson, that "health care
lawyers examine the bounds of their own potential liability like they never have done before"
(citing W. Bradley Tully, Attorney Liability Under the Fraud andAbuse Laws: ManagingRisk
by Managing the Client Relationship, HEALTH LAW, July 1999, at 17)).
190. See Health Law Symposium, supra note 13, at 444 (noting that given tansaction
"might or might not" come within statute and concluding that statute's scope is often difficult
to predict due to its vagueness).
191. See Twardy & Shea, supra note 15, at 22 (concluding that if client consults attorney
about statute, he or she already knows of its existence, thereby foreclosing defense that client
did not act "knowingly and willfully").
192. See Killgore, supra note 19, at 1229 (noting that requesting an advisory opinion is
structured, time consuming, and expensive (citing JOST & DAVIES, supra note 96, at 159-61)).
193. See Norris, supra note 28, at 139 (discussing limited budgets of small health care
providers).
194. See Killgore, supra note 19, at 1216 n.12, 1223 n.54 (stating that laws governing
health care relationships prohibit many relationships, investments, and marketing practices that
are legal in other businesses (quoting BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., supra note 19, at 574) and
raising critics' claims that statute is incomprehensible and harmful to innovative alliances
beneficial to care health consumers).
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problems of economic inefficiency.195
V Economic Analysis
The concept of optimal criminal sanctions suggests that policymakers
should construct criminal laws to impose a sanction severe enough to make
the punishment more costly than the benefit derived by committing the
crime." However, if the level of punishment is set too high for the offense
and if there is the chance of accidental conviction, the statute will deter risk-
adverse individuals from engaging in socially beneficial transactions." The
problem becomes acute as the offense proceeds toward the possibility of
accidental conviction.'" This lack of clarity is a problem for even the most
sophisticated health care attorneys who attempt to advise their clients about
arrangements implicating the anti-kickback statute.199 Moreover, federal
circuit courts have not agreed upon whether there is a "one purpose" test or
what the standard of intent is for anti-kickback violations. 2°° Therefore, many
scholars and practitioners agree that much ambiguity and confusion surrounds
the question of legality of health care transactions. 01 The scienter require-
ments of the statute, which require knowing and willful action to commit a
.violation, supposedly overcome this problem, but really have only muddied
the waters. 2°2 The combination of the statute's ambiguity and threat of harsh
195. See Blumstein, supra note 135, at 120 (commenting that anti-kickback statute crim-
inalizes "practices that encourage cost-effective care . . . and the development of efficient
relationships among providers").
196. POsN R,supra note 11, at 242.
197. Id. at 243-44; see Morris & Thompson, supra note 177, at 350-51 (asserting that in
complex regulatory environment, ambiguity harms the honest, risk-adverse businessperson and
encourages reckless and unscrupulous individuals).
198. PosNlR, supra note 11, 259 ("[B]ecause criminal sanctions are severe, to attach them
to accidental conduct (and a fortiori to unavoidable conduct) creates incentives to steer clear
of what may be a very broad zone of perfectly lawful activity in order to avoid the risk of
criminal punishment."); see Timothy Stoltzfus Jost & Sharon L. Davies, The Empire Strikes
Back: A Critique of the Backlash Against Fraud andA buse Enforcement, 51 ALA. L. REV. 239,
295 n.287 (1999) (applying Posner's analysis to health care context).
199. See supra note 189 and accompanying text (discussing inability of experienced health
care attorneys to predict legality of transactions).
200. See supra Part MI.C (discussing competing interpretations of scienter).
201. See supra note 107 and accompanying text (discussing a number of sources finding
that anti-kickback statute inhibits beneficial transactions); Medicare and State Health Care
Programs: Fraud and Abuse; Clarification of the 010 Safe Harbor Anti-Kickback Provisions
59 Fed. Reg. 37,202, 37,203 (July 21, 1994) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 1001) (recording 010's
admission that statute and regulations can be ambiguous and confusing).
202. See JosT & DAVIES, supra note 96, at 101 (characterizing state of scienter element as
"murky").
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criminal penalties proves that the anti-kickback statute deters activity at the
margins of legality, such as e-health ventures based on referral models.
The regulatory framework prohibits common economic arrangements and
inhibits e-health innovation disproportionately. 3 As developed in the case
of the hypothetical physician's Web site, a hospital's provision to physicians
of free Web sites with the hospital's logo on the home page may be an imper-
missible kickback." ° The hospital's liability for engaging in the transaction
rests upon whether the hospital had the requisite intent to induce referrals.205
Without the intent to induce referrals, the logo on the Web page is merely
marketing.2' 6 Unfortunately, the distinction between inducing referrals and
merely marketing is, at best, very fine.2' This uncertainty leads to the per-
ceived necessity of securing extensive opinion letters from counsel and of
requesting advisory opinions from the 01G, wasting hundreds of millions of
dollars wasted each year in pursuit of elusive certainty about the legality of
health care transactions.2"e Moreover, it results in a significant loss of revenue
from foregone transactions.2"
VI. Proposed Solutions
Although courts have relied upon numerous policy arguments to support
convictions under the anti-kickback statute,210 two primary justifications for
203. See Fried et al., supra note 22, at 128-29 ("Business arrangements and transactions
that are structurally sound from a business perspective frequently implicate (and occasionally
violate) the principal federal laws designed to prevent and deter fraud and abuse within
Medicare, Medicaid, and other federally funded health care programs.").
204. See supra notes 82-93 and accompanying text (discussing potential liability for
physician Web page partnered with hospital or pharmaceutical company).
205. See supra Part IfL.C (discussing unsettled scienter requirement).
206. See Fried, supra note 9, at 36 (commenting on fine distinction between intent to
induce referrals and intent to market hospital).
207. Id.
208. See Twardy & Shea, supra note 15, at 21 (commenting on statute's imposition of
expensive monitoring and transaction costs on health-care clients).
209. See supra note 194 (discussing result of lost revenue through rejection of strategic
business relationships implicating statute).
210. See United States v. Ruttenberg, 625 F.2d 173, 177 (7th Cir. 1980) (concluding that
increased cost to federal health care program is irrelevant in fight of alternative policies served
by statute). The Ruttenberg Court stated the following:
Though we are concerned with the law, not the ethics of the medical profession,
United States v. Porter, 591 F.2d [1048, 1058 (5th Cir. 1979)], it should be noted
that the law does not make increased cost to the government the sole criterion of
corruption. In prohibiting "kickbacks," Congress need not have spelled out the
obvious truisms that, while unnecessary expenditure of money earned and contrib-
uted by taxpaying fellow citizens may exacerbate the result of the crime, kickback
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the government's enforcement of the statute are reduction of health care
cost2 ' and prevention of harm to patients.2"2 If a proposed transaction violates
neither of the above policies, it seems logical that the imposition of liability
for kickback arrangements is inappropriate.2"
A. Legislative Preemption of"One Purpose" Test
As unworkable as the anti-kickback statute may be in practice, the
judicially created "one purpose" doctrine of Greber is particularly problem-
atic. 14 Either Congress or HHS should eliminate this illogical doctrine from
the law. The reality of capitalism is that businesspeople react to the dynamics
of the free market, including competition. 5 If consumers demand electronic
interaction with their physicians, market participants will create surreptitious
referral arrangements.2 6 The concept of goodwill is fundamental to capital-
ism and the anti-kickback statute is wrong to ignore it.217 It would be more
schemes can freeze competing suppliers from the system, can mask the possibility
of government price reductions, can misdirect program funds, and, when propor-
tional, can erect strong temptations to order more drugs and supplies than needed.
Nor need Congress have spelled out duties, beyond the duty of avoiding receipt and
payment of kickbacks.
Id. at 177 n.9.
211. See Williams, supra note 16, at 295 (stating that kickbacks may impede physicians'
judgment, leading to increased cost and harm to patients). Williams points to increased cost as
the primary motivation for government prosecution of health care fraud. Id. at 296. However,
he notes a number of anti-kickback convictions in which the government introduced no evidence
of increased cost to Medicare. Id. at 296 n.41 (citing Bay State Ambulance & Hosp. Rental
Ser., 874 F.2d 20, 25-27 (1st Cir. 1989); United States v. Ruttenberg, 625 F.2d 173, 177 (7th
Cir. 1980); United States v. Denton, No. 90-55-Cr-T-17 (M.D. Fla. May 30, 1990); Andrew
Orosso, Medical Necessity and the Medicare and MedicaidAnti-Kickback Statute, 40 FED. B.
NEWS & J. 301,303 (June 1993)).
212. See Williams, supra note 16, at 295 (suggesting that kickbacks may harm patients by
diminishing quality of medical services).
213. See Jakobsen, supra note 35, at 169 (suggesting that telemedicine cuts costs by
allowing providers to diagnose and treat illness earlier, rather than in later stages when treatment
is more expensive (citing Vybomy, supra note 7, at 63)).
214. See infra notes 217-21 and accompanying text (discussing nature of "goodwill" and
free market's impact on medical community).
215. See supra note 18 (asserting that regulatory prohibitions notwithstanding, as a practical
matter, health care industry creates referral arrangements (citing Health Law Symposium, supra
note 13, at 444)). For example: A hospital might provide a Web site and support to "cultivate
the goodwill of the physician." What may in fact be occurring is an unstated understanding that
the hospital will maintain the Web site as long as the flow of inpatient referrals continues.
216. See supra note 18 (discussing realities of medical practice).
217. See STANLEYSEGEL&DAvIDA. SIEGEL, ACCOUNTINGAD FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE:
A GUIDE TO BASIC CONCEPTS 70-71 (1983) (describing concept of "goodwill" in business
valuation). From a business perspective, goodwill is the additional value of a venture in excess
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realistic for Congress to implement a balancing test requiring the government
to prove either increased cost or actual harm to a patient." If the social util-
ity - that is, efficiency increase - from any purpose of the transaction out-
weighs the cost of potential over-utilization of Medicare by referrals, the
possible formula could provide that the transaction should not give rise to
liability.219 Should a physician and hospital create a system that reduces
Medicare costs while both the physician and hospital increase their revenues,
they would have achieved a positive result.22 Eliminating one hundred
percent of an actor's motivations in making referrals is impossible, and it
rejects fuidamental concepts of capitalism. 221
B. Discounted Technology Safe Harbor
Congress has vested the HHS with the responsibility to regulate the
application of the anti-kickback statute and granted it the authority to protect
of its total individual assets reflecting its extra earning power. Id. at 70. Name recognition
resulting from past advertising, customer loyalty, quality of service, efficient management, and
established relationships with vendors or suppliers may all contribute to an entity's goodwill. Id.
at 70-71. A hypothetical example of the value of goodwill in the medical community helps to
illuminate the anti-kickback statute's fallacious assumption that goodwill does not exist in medi-
cine. Suppose cardiologists A and B both hold staff privileges at hospitalXin a city with compet-
ing hospitals. Over a ten-year period, A refers a large stream of patients to hospitalX, generating
significant profits for the hospital. During the same period, B refers some of his patients to hos-
pitaIX but also refers a number to the hospital's competitors Y and Z. In year ten, the lucrative and
prestigious position of Chief of Cardiology becomes vacant Assuming that physicians A and B
have identical credentials, given the goodwill that A has created from the previous referrals, it is
logical thatA will receive the nod for the position, even though the action technically violates the
anti-kickback statute. Of course, well-counseled hospital administrators will not record this
motive in the corporate minutes, and it will be almost impossible to prosecute. One scholar has
analogized the current regulatory climate to that of a speakeasy, "where sipping sherry is winked
at and only loud and obnoxious drunks are prosecuted." Tamsen Douglass Love, Note, Toward
a Fair and PracticalDefinition of "Willfuy" in the Medicare/MedicaidAnt-Kickback Statute,
50 VAND. L. REV. 1029,1043 (1997) (citing Blumstein, supra note 135, at 218).
218. See Williams, supra note 16, at 308 (labeling prosecution of health care providerwhen
he has caused no harm as inequitable and proposing requirement of harm).
219. See id. (proposing economic balancing test).
220. See supra notes 211-12 and accompanying text (noting statute's goal of improving
patient care and reducing costs).
221. See Krakoff & Holloran, supra note 135, at S50. Krakoff and Holloran assert the
following:
In many contexts, the government will have little difficulty proving directly or
circumstantially that a business arrangement had, at least one purpose, the intention
to induce future business. Individuals and companies enter into business arrange-
ments for a multitude of reasons. Rarely are these arrangements made where the
parties do not have some thought of doing future business or where they do not
expect to obtain a benefit from the arrangement.
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certain arrangements through the promulgation of safe harbors."2 HHS's
charge includes updating the statute periodically to reflect changing business
practices and technologies in the health care industry.' The promulgation of
new safe harbors does not solve the overbroad and imprecise nature of the
anti-kickback statute. However, industry groups should lobby HHS for regu-
lations favorable to developing technology as a temporary solution until
policymakers revise the statute itself. 24
The health care industry should urge HHS to recognize that the provision
of free or substantially discounted hardware presents little threat of abuse under
the statute.' By considering a cost-benefit approach, policymakers will save
many more Medicare dollars by the efficient use of electronic patient records,
transmission of data images from laboratories, and development of new tech-
nologies, with the cost of the innovation borne wholly by the private sector.226
Industry trade groups should lobby HHS to seek comments in the Federal
Register about potential transactions that present little chance of abuse because
under the current rules, "[m]any entities are offering providers 'free' Web
sites .... While the initial development of [ I Web site[s] may require only a
minimal capital outlay on the part of the entity, the government would still
likely view the provision and maintenance of [ Web site[s] as 'in kind' remu-
neration .... 22
C. Shift from Intent-Based Framework to Objective Standard
This Note identifies the flaws in the anti-kickback statute's design."
Congress drafted the statute broadly, and it has become a weapon of intimida-
tion that forces individuals away from the gray areas of the law into only "safe
transactions." 9 This result is hardly efficient. Policymakers should jettison
222. See JOST & DAVIEs, supra note 96, at 124-25 (describing OIG's role in promulgating
safe harbors).
223. See Medicare and Medicaid Patient and Program Protection Act of 1987 (MMPPPA),
Pub. L. No. 100-93, § 2, 101 Stat. 680, 682 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(bX7) (1994))
(discussing 010's responsibilities in promulgating safe harbors).
224. See Bentivoglio, supra note 150, at 76 (imploring health care and technology indus-
tries to lobby Congress for updated regulations).
225. See supra note 166 (presenting hypothetical arrangement illustrating positive results
accruing from telemedicine).
226. See supra Part I.C (describing benefits of physician Web site with costs subsidized
by advertisers).
227. Fried et al., supra note 22, at 129 (discussing government's probable negative
response to provision of free Web site).
228. See supra notes 196-97 and accompanying text (discussing economic concept of opti-
mal deterrence and attempt to encourage greatest number of socially beneficial transactions).
229. See Health Law Symposium, supra note 13, at 447 (suggesting that 010 employs
intimidation tactics by prosecuting huge entities such as Columbia/HCA for activities that are
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the intent-based muddle in favor of a clear lawsimilar to the Stark self-referral
statute"3 based on objective criteria for violation.2"' The value of an objective
framework under the Stark regulations is that all players know clearly what
is permissible, and although they may not agree with the regulations, it is clear
which transactions they must avoid." 2 Of course, in contemplating this strict
liability regime, lawmakers must draw lines. 233 It would do more harm than
good merely to retain the current sweeping remuneration language and shift
the proof standard for violation to strict liability.23 Lawmakers should ac-
company the shift to an objective standard with a change back to the original
language prohibiting "bribes and kickbacks."23 The restricted nature of a
reconstructed anti-kickback statute will not open wide the door to abuse
because the government still will be able to target these abuses under a myriad
of additional federal laws, including generic criminal, mail, and wire fraudP'
statutes and the False Claims Act.3 7 The OIG also would retain the adminis-
trative authority to exclude providers from further participation in Medicare
and Medicaid programs.
238
common in industry to "hold[ ] someone out as an example and beat[ ] them up in public to kind
of scare everyone else off").
230. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (1994). See generally Albert Shay & Gary Francesconi, Pro-
posed Stark HI Rules: Clarification or More Confusion?, 31 J. HEALTH & HOSP. L. 95 (1998)
(providing extensive discussion of Stark I and Stark 11 legislative history).
231. See JOST & DAVIES, supra note 96, at 219 (describing Stark's lack of intent required
for violation, but accompanied by voluminous regulations describing exempt relationships).
232. See JOST & DAVIES, supra note 96, at 209 (describing clear-cut nature of whether
violation exists).
233. Id. at 221-25 (discussing contours of Stark limits).
234. See supra Part I..C (discussing overbroad nature of current scienter elements).
235. See supra Part 1ll.B (discussing anti-kickback statute's legislative history).
236. See Schofield & Weaver, supra note 12, at 620-22 (listing alternative bases for prose-
cution, including False Claims Act, False Statements Act, mail fraud, wire fraud, and generic
fraud statutes). "The generic criminal fraud statutes include: 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1994) (conspir-
acy to defraud government), 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994) (mail fraud), 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1994)
(wire fraud) .. and 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1996) (RICO)." Id. at 621 n.20.
237. 18 U.S.C. § 287 (1994); see Schofield & Weaver, supra note 12, at 622-26 (discuss-
ing prosecution of health care fraud under False Claims Act).
238. See Schofield & Weaver, supra note 12, at 621 & n.23 ("Exclusion from participa-
tion in Medicare and Medicaid programs is the equivalent of 'capital punishment' for health
care entities." (citing David S. Nalven, Medicare and Medicaid Fraud: An Enforcement
Priority for the 1990s, BOSTON B.J., SEFr.-OCT. 1994, at 9, 16)). Administrative exclusion
from Medicare and Medicaid is so severe because the federal government is the payer of about
40% of health care expenditures each year and no significant provider can afford to lose this
revenue. See Gerson & Gladieux, supra note 14, at 171 (describing significance of exclusion
penalty).
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VII. Conclusion
There is great potential for Web sites linking hospitals, physicians,
pharmaceutical manufacturers, and consumers to streamline the delivery of
health care services. 9 However, advancing technology alone will not reduce
the cost of health care or provide consumers with direct physical improve-
ments in health care unless the government rethinks regulation of the industry
for the digital age.24 Congress drafted the anti-kickback statute with noble
intentions of safeguarding public dollars and protecting patients from unscru-
pulous individuals.24 The statute has not been successful in practice.242 The
anti-kickback statute particularly is unsuited for the digital age of medical
delivery, in which private financing must play a prominent role and policy-
makers must clarify the legality of action. 3 It is time for health care regula-
tors to recognize that medicine is a business operating in a capitalist econ-
omy.'M The reformation of the health care fraud and abuse statutes is not the
responsibility solely of policymakers at the Department of Health and Human
Services and the Department of Justice; industry trade groups must vocalize
support in driving these changes.245 The future of e-health is bright, but the
timetable and track of its development rest in large part upon the successful
modernization of the anti-kickback statute.24 Until the health care community
persuades Congress to reconstruct the anti-kickback statute for the Digital
Age, physicians will have to continue steering a delicate course between the
Scylla of aggressive fraud prosecutors and the Charybdis of consumers de-
manding interactive health care on the Web. 27
239. See supra notes 66-72 and accompanying text (describing elements and potential of
connectivity sites).
240. See supra note 22 and accompanying text (describing revolutionary potential of e-
health, but calling for appropriate revisions of regulations).
241. See supra notes 211-12 and accompanying text (discussing statute's dual purpose).
242. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (noting that statute prohibits efficient rela-
tionships allowed in other industries).
243. See supra note 28 (discussing need for private financing of telemedical endeavors),
supra note 203 and accompanying text (suggesting that statutory ambiguity could lead to over-
deterrence).
244. See supra notes 217-21 and accompanying text (discussing nature of referral "good-
will" and impact of market dynamics on health care industry).
245. See Bentivoglio, supra note 150, at 76 (calling upon health care and technology
industries to place e-health promotion on national agenda).
246. See supra note 150 (concluding that inadequacy of antiquated government regulation
will significantly affect future of c-health).
247. See supra note 229 (discussing aggressive prosecution tactics 010 employs); supra
notes 47-48 and accompanying text (noting consumer demand for Web interaction).
ARTICLES

